Obama and his Treasury Secretary Geithner announced compensation caps of $500,000 for the top five officials of companies accessing TARP funds. That makes a lot of sense to me. In grad school a big theme was that in order to work a policy initiative needs to be technically correct, implementable, and politically palatable (I think.) As it stands who knows if TARP is technically correct. In my view it almost certainly is not. But it is definitely _not_ politically palatable. I don't have better data but Bloomberg says that Goldman, Morgans Stanley, Merrill, Lehman, and Bear Stearns paid out $145 billion in bonuses from 2003 through 2007. It's obviously specious but let's just say that then on average they have paid out $145bn/5years = $30billion per year in bonuses. That means that of the $350bn in TARP money spent so far about 9% has gone to bonuses. This is extremely back of the envelope but people just don't like it when 10% of their hard-earned money is spent on bonuses for people who make pretty juicy salaries to begin with. So in my view the caps are a good idea to make TARP work -- apart from just being good taste.
Some further thoughts on these, however:
- The way the regulation is worded, as far as I'm aware, it's the top 5 people who are capped. My boss thinks that banks will get around this. He think the incentive is going to be very large for banks to say: "You know what, we've come to realize that a completely flat structure is best. From now on we are all vice-presidents here at Morgan Stanley."
- You can imagine a scenario in which a faltering bank does not take TARP b/c it would limit the top five people's pay. I mean, Goldman for example, said that they might actually give the TARP money back. There's principal agent problem, and I don't know if there are any mechanisms in place to solve it.
- As for the argument that, as Meredith Whitney of Oppenheimer said, a cap on compensation would lead to a brain drain in finance, there are three considerations:
a) I somewhat doubt that. A college grad, even one of the "best and the brightest" is not going to start at Goldman b/c maybe 20 years down the road he would become CEO and make tons and tons and tons of money. And a CEO is not going to quit the line of business b/c of the pay cap -- the opportunity cost is too high. So I really doubt that partial equilibrium analysis has much validity.
b) I somewhat doubt that the marginal revenue product of (financial) capital is very large at these levels. What I mean is that I doubt that the extra dollar (or million) spent on executive compensation gets you _that_ much better of a CEO, someone who is _that_ much better at steering the ship. The fact that the market produces this outcome is obviously an argument for this but I'd like to think this through and see if there are not other incentive structures that could produce this type of equilibrium but that also imply that it might not be efficient. Plus, I wonder how much worse the next in line guy (who would take the job and not also leave) would be.
And finally c) What would happen if all the "best and the brightest" as Whitney says were to leave the business and figure out how to make money elsewhere? First, if it hadn't been for pretty smart and really driven people who had invented structured finance as we know it we wouldn't be in this mess. And second, what are the general equilibrium effects of all the "smart" people leaving finance and going into other business, law, politics, public service... I doubt the net effects would be negative.